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Abstract. Mobile agents traverse the Internet, often on behalf of their users.  Intelligent search agents
access dynamic information in heterogeneous environments. The legal implications of the use of agents
in such situations are not fully understood.  In this paper a scenario in which a mobile agent searches a
multimedia database on behalf of its user, is used to illustrate the legal and technical issues involved.
Requirements related to identity management, integrity, traceability and availability are identified and
discussed in the context of existing technology.
1 Introduction
Mobile  agents  traverse  the  Internet,  moving  to  different  sites  with  different  characteristics.  Mobile
intelligent  search  agents  access  information  in  heterogeneous,  often  dynamic,  environments.  The legal
implications of the use of agents in such situations are not fully understood.  This paper discusses a number
of issues related to identity management,  integrity, traceability and availability, continuing the research
done within the context of the ALIAS project, in which legal implications of the use of agent systems are
investigated from both a legal and a technological perspective [1]. A scenario in which mobile search agents
searches a multimedia database on behalf of its user,  is used to illustrate the legal and technical issues
involved, identifying a number of the requirements involved in the context of existing technology.
Klusch [4] uses the term “intelligent information agents” instead of intelligent search agents and defines
them to  be   “autonomous  computational  software  entities  that  are  especially  meant  to  (1)  provide  a
proactive resource discovery, (2) resolve information impedance of information consumers and providers,
and (3) offer value-added information services and products.” This definition suffices to define the types of
agents to which this paper refers. 
    Software agents themselves are assumed to have the following properties [2]: (1) autonomy (they have
control over their own actions and state); (2) social ability (they can communicate with other agents); (3)
reactivity (they react to changes in its environment); (4) pro-activeness (they make plans to reach their goals
and can take initiative to pursue these). Additionally, agents are assumed to be mobile, that is, they can
move between network-connected computers. Mobility has many potential benefits, which can be grouped
into three categories: performance, resource access and security [3], as discussed in section 2 in the context
of a specific domain.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide an overview of all related research: literature on intelligent
search agents1 and personal assistant agents2 clearly influences this work as does research on agent platforms
and  mobile  agent  security  issues  (e.g.  Borselius  [5],  Cubillos  [6]  and  Bellavista  [7]).   Protection  of
intellectual property3  briefly addressed in this paper is discussed more extensively in the literature. 
2 An intelligent search agent scenario
In our scenario, mobile agents are used to access information across the internet: information stored in a
remote multimedia database.  Users interact with  a personal search service designed to  help them find
snippets of movies in multi-media databases. To this purpose, a user interacts with the user interface on
his/her computer or PDA. The user interface in turn, assigns each agent a specific search task together with
an address: the address of the location to which the agent is to migrate. An example search task could be to
find a snippet of a movie picturing a scene of a dog riding a bike. 
Migration of agents has several advantages. First of all,  it reduces the amount of data sent over the
Internet [8]. Secondly, a continuous, reliable high-bandwidth connection with the multimedia database is
not needed. Thirdly, it provides the multimedia database service providers the option to exercise control
over data returned to the users of mobile agents, e.g. to prevent possible misuse of the data. Especially when
information is sensitive to reproduction, as is the case with multimedia files in a multimedia database, there
is a high risk of infringement to the copyright holder’s ability to exercise copyrights on the items in the
database.
In this scenario the multi-media database service provider is assumed to be trusted and known to the
agents. Agents are also assumed to have appropriate credentials for access, e.g. have a login or signed
certificates.  An individual  agent contacts  the  remote  site  to  which it  wishes to  migrate.  If  the  remote
location is willing to host the agent  and is willing and capable of providing the necessary resources (i.e., in
this  case,  access  to  the  multimedia database),  the  agent  migrates  to  the remote  location to  search  the
database. The search process itself is not addressed in this paper. 
Once the search task has been completed, this scenario assumes that the agent contacts a guardian agent
provided by the hosting location (as proposed by Noordende [9]). The guardian agent notifies the user and
provides low-quality streams of the video snippets for pre-view purposes. The user is given the opportunity
to accept one or more of the results, or to provide its agent with feedback on the results. If necessary, the
user’s agent can continue the search task based on this feedback. Once the user has received the information
he/she was looking for, a high quality download or shipment can be arranged along with payment options. 
The scenario as described above can be depicted as follows, see also Figure 1. The desired information
cannot be found in the user’s domain, but is available at a remote location.  The personal search service
runs at one location, the multimedia database access service at another. Both locations have the necessary
middleware, i.e. agent platform software, to host agents and services, migration and communication.  In
Figure 1 the remote location is depicted as the service provider. At the physical level a network connection,
e.g. Internet or a mobile phone network, enables communication between the agent platform locations.
1  See for example [4] and Volker Roth, Jan Peters, and Ulrich Pinsdorf. A distributed content-based search engine
based  on  mobile  code.  In  Proc.  20th  ACM  Symposium  on  Applied  Computing,  Special  Track  on  Agents,
Interactions, Mobility, and Systems (SAC/AIMS), Santa Fe, NM, USA, March 2005.
2  For example: L. Chen and K. Sycara, 1998, WebMate: A Personal Agent for Browsing and Searching, Proceedings
of the 2nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, AGENTS '98, ACM, May,
1998, pp. 132 – 139.
3  See for example Sonntag, M., Legal aspects of mobile agents. With special consideration of the proposed Austrian
E-Commerce Law. In: Robert Trappl (Ed.): Cybernetics and Systems 2002. Proc. of the 16th European Meeting on
Cybernetics and Systems Research. Wien: Austrian Society for Cybernetic Studies 2002, 153-158 and Belmon, S.
G., and Yee, B. S. Mobile agents and intellectual property protection. In Rothermel and Hohl,(Eds.) Proceedings of
the Second International Workshop on Mobile Agents (MA ’98), vol. 1477 of Lecture Notes in Computer  Science.
Springer Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg, September 1998. pp. 172-182. 
Figure 1: User and Service Provider
3 Legal and security issues
Before an agent can start searching the multimedia database, it will first try to negotiate an agreement with
the agent platform that offers access to the multimedia database service. The platform and the visiting agent
must use the same protocols to negotiate. An agreement is needed in which both the facilities provided by
the platform (both resources and services) and the procedures on the platform (e.g. whether the agent can
communicate with its user while the agent is on the platform and whether the agent’s process is terminated
after  it  has  finished  its  search)  are  defined.  In  addition  to  the  above  agreement,  an  agent  may want
guarantees on the level of performance offered by an agent platform. If this is the case, a Service Level
Agreement (SLA) can be agreed upon (more on SLAs follows later in this section).
As shown in Figure 2, there are four types of entities involved in an agent’s search in the multimedia
database: the user, the search agent, the owner and the agent platform. An agent represents the user and the
platform owner is represented by the platform (in the scenario we assume the service provider to be the
platform owner but  that  is  not  necessarily the  case).  To  ensure  correct  functioning of  the service,  the
identity of each agent needs to be distinguished. Identity management is elaborated upon in the next section.
For  a  reliable service,  the integrity of  both the agent  and  the  agent  platform needs  to  be  guaranteed.
Integrity is dealt with in 3.2. From the moment the agent contacts the platform to negotiate, logs are kept of
the activities engaged in by every agent on the platform. Issues of logging and tracing are addressed in
section 3.3. Finally, availability of the platform is an essential part of the performance offered to the agent,
which is covered in 3.4.
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Figure 2: Model of service provision 
3.1 Identity management
Identity management in agent systems is  important  for  various reasons.  First  of  all  for  the purpose of
administrating which entities are in the system. 
Secondly,  identity management is  needed for  the application of  access policies to  determine who is
allowed to do what and with which credentials.  Based on this information, access policies may be enforced,
e.g. a migrating agent may need to provide details and proof of its affiliation to gain access to a specific
location. Other information about agents may also need to be administrated, such as the agent owner, user,
company and programmer. 
A service provider may also have special contracts with important clients, e.g. a large television company,
determining that these clients’ agents are to be run on specific dedicated machines with a guaranteed quality
of service and security for  example.
Thirdly, identity management is needed for logging and tracing purposes. Suppose two agents in the
scenario have the same identifier. If something goes wrong, it cannot be determined which one of the agents
caused the problem. Communication and actions that are logged should be relatable to the actor and to the
party who is responsible for the actor’s behaviour.
Requirement 1: Agents need to have unique identifiers.  
A technical  solution for  registration of  agent  identities  is  the use of  both  locally and  globally unique
identifiers (LUIDs and GUIDs). GUIDs can be registered at the moment an agent is created; an agent’s
identity can be coupled to the identity of a user. An example of an approach to agent identity administration
is described by Roth [10].  In addition one or  more LUIDs can be used in the course of an agent’s life.
Note that there is an apparent discrepancy between a possible wish for anonymity of an agent user on the
one hand and the service provider’s need to know the exact identity of the user of the visiting agent on the
other hand [11, 12]. For example, an agent user buying movies wants his/her agent to search the multimedia
database without others knowing what (kind of) movie(s) the agent is requested to search for. On the other
hand, when an error has occurred, e.g. due to a malfunctioning agent, the service provider may need to trace
which events happened and (to determine liability) whose agent was responsible. Thus, a balance between
the user’s need for anonymity and the interests of the service provider of the multimedia database is needed.
In our scenario of an agent searching for movie snippets requested by his/her user, this implies that different
levels of knowledge on the identity of both agent and user may be required in different phases of the agent’s
activities. Four different levels of knowledge on identities can be distinguished: untraceable anonymity,
traceable  anonymity,  untraceable  pseudonymity  and  traceable  pseudonymity  [1].  When  searching  the
multimedia database, an agent does not need to reveal its user’s identity, traceable pseudonymity would be
sufficient. However, when the searching results in the buying of a movie, a user’s true identity may be
needed  to  complete  the  transaction  (e.g.  for  credit  card  payment,  submitting  a  cardholders’  name  is
required).
 
Requirement 2: Agent and user identities need to be managed.
Technical solutions entail the introduction of local names (LUIDs) and multi-phased identity management.
Local names can function as a pseudonym for a specific agent in a specific environment. For example, an
agent’s GUID may only be known its user and to a Trusted Third Party (TTP). The TTP can be used for the
administration of local names and the mapping on agent GUIDs. When certain conditions are met, the TTP
could provide the GUID that is connected to a local name, reveal a user’s identity or show links between
local names.  Agents can also be assigned a local identity within the location at which they reside and with
which they are registered and addressed.
Managing levels  of  knowledge regarding identities in  different phases,  termed multi-phased identity
management is needed. How this should be done and who should be in charge of the administration is still
subject of research.
For fault-tolerance and performance reasons, an agent can be cloned or copied. Or agents can spawn
child- or helper-agents to search in different databases in parallel. Different approaches have currently been
implemented: more research is needed.
3.2 Integrity
To ensure correct functioning of a multimedia database, the integrity of both an agent platform and visiting
agents is essential.  In other words,  it  is crucial that the data and transmissions are not “unduly altered,
erased or supplemented and that the physical objects involved (…) are not damaged or destroyed.”4 
Protection of entities
Current  research in this  matter  concentrates  on prevention  of  attacks  on hosts  of  agent  platforms [7].
However, an agent platform could also modify the code of an agent, e.g. by changing a variable and thus
having the agent recommend ten movies instead of five. Furthermore, agents can attack each other. For
example,  in our scenario our user agent could attack the guardian agent of the service provider.  If the
service provider disenables direct communication between a user and its agent, a user has no means to
verify whether its agent or its messages have been tampered with, until the agent leaves the remote location.
Thus, as Yee points out as well, protection and detection measures to safeguard the integrity of the agent
and its computation are needed [13]. 
 
Requirement 3: Protection and detection measures are needed to safeguard the integrity of the agent and
agent platform.
4  The definition of integrity we use is cited from [1], p. 53 below.
Both Borselius [5] and Cubillos [6] give an overview of protection measures for agent platforms and agents.
Example measures for platform protection are sandboxing or jailing of agents and the use of signed code [9,
14, 15]. Note that code signing is also useful for agent protection and detection of changes. Other measures
for agent protection described include using trusted nodes, execution tracing [16] and encryption of code
and functions [17]. Examples of other approaches are watermarking and fingerprinting of agents [18], code
obfuscation [19], re-execution of agents [20], semantic encryption [21], and integrity based encryption [22].
Protection of data
A mobile  agent  carries  data,  which  may be  relatable  to  its  user,  e.g.  the  search  request  of  the  user,
passwords and usernames, etc. Since an agent completely relies on the benevolence of an agent platform,
confiscation and modification of these data is obviously undesirable. In fact, it may be hard for agents to
keep information secret from its hosting agent platform [23].
Several  types  of  data  possessed  by an agent  can be  distinguished,  for  example:  assignment (search
request),  credentials,  internal  logs,  and  gathered  information.  All  of  these  data  need  protection  and
appropriate detection measures to safeguard their integrity.
Requirement 4: Protection and detection measures are needed to safeguard agent data.
Measures for agent protection, as listed above, can often be used to protect the agent data as well. Another
technique for protecting the agent state (and detecting changes) is introduced in Ajanta: signed append-only
containers for agent data [14]. This approach is followed in Mansion [9] and AgentScape [15]. Examples of
other protection techniques are partial result protection [24] and detecting attempts of tampering [25].
Additionally, protection is needed for the data located in the domain of service provider, e.g. logs and
identity administration of the agent platform and contents of the multimedia database. For example, in the
scenario, a mobile agent interacts with the multimedia database and processes a number of items. Anyone of
the items could be confiscated or communicated (e.g. via covert channels) to a third party. This is obviously
undesirable and should be prevented. 
The multimedia database and its content are protected by intellectual property regulations. In the EU, if a
multimedia database matches certain requirements, it may be protected under database law. If that is the
case,  searching  the  multimedia  database  requires  the  rightholders’  consent.  Also,  the  contents  of  a
multimedia database are likely to be protected by copyright. Not only the copying of an entire copyrighted
movie, but also the copying of parts of it could entail copyright infringement. Movie snippets can therefore
not be extracted without the rightholders’ consent. If  the service provider  is not the copyrights holder,
he/she will need permission from the copyright holder to exploit the database and permit others to search
the copyrighted items. If the agent copies items from the database without the rightholder’s consent, the
agent infringes copyright, for which its user is responsible. 
The copyright holder may want to keep as much control on the giving out of snippets as possible, in an
effort to prevent future copyright infringement.
 
Requirement 5: Protection and detection measures are needed to safeguard the contents of the multimedia
database.
An option to safeguard content data is to inspect an agent before it  leaves a platform and to disenable
communication. Another option is to agree in advance that an agent will terminate after handing a message
transferring  its  desired  items  (or  their  identifiers)  to  a  guardian  agent.  Noordende  suggests  the  latter
approach [9]. 
Protection of transmissions
Communications between entities in agent platforms need to be secured, e.g. to prevent reading or re-play
by third parties. Communication needs to be secured if it takes place over unsafe or unreliable network
connections. Depending on the application and architecture of the platform, agent-to-agent communication
should be secured. Realisation of secured agent-to-agent communication may be problematic if the agent
platform cannot be trusted. If agents cannot have secrets, they may also not be able to keep a private key
since it could be captured.
Requirement 6:  Protection  and  detection  measures  are  needed  to  safeguard  the  integrity  of  the
transmissions.
3.3 Logs and traceability
Logging communication and actions of entities in the system is useful for reconstructing situations after they
have occurred.  This can be particularly of use if damage has been incurred. Firstly, for example, if and
when a content provider  discovers that a particular snippet from his multimedia database is  circulating
among Internet users, the content provider may want to know who was responsible for distribution of copies
of this snippet without authorisation. To find out who was responsible, the content provider will both need
to have logged which agent accessed which movies and identify the user of this particular agent. Secondly,
logging is needed to trace errors in the system. If the platform logs show that one of the visiting agents is
overusing the service, e.g. because it is consuming the far more resources while searching the multimedia
database than it is allowed to, the particular agent should be found and perhaps even killed.5 Thirdly, logs
can be used in the process of determining liability, e.g. when a denial of service has occurred which has
caused much damage and the logs show that a specific agent was responsible. Fourthly, logs can be used to
determine where and when an agent has been tampered with.
Requirement 7: Logging of communication and actions of entities is necessary.
Because of the distributed nature of the system, there is no single solution for all situations. Who should log
what, where and how? If logging is done locally, and/or by agents, information could be lost if a node or an
agent fails. Updating information is complex and intricate, certainly when malicious hosts are possible.
Notions and models of trust play a role in the update policies for distributed logging. Further research in
this area is needed. 
Requirement 8: Logs must be robust and should not disappear because of a failing node.
Among the data that is logged, there may be personal data that is reducible to the agent’s user. If this is the
case,  privacy  regulations  play  a  vital  role.  For  example,  gathering  information  on  a  personal  agent's
searching habits could amount to a profile containing personal data of the agent’s user. In the EU, any
processing of personal data is subject to detailed regulations.6 
Requirement 9: User privacy needs to be respected in accordance with privacy regulations.
In most cases, a user explicitly has to consent to the processing of any personal data. Therefore, an agent
platform must either anonymise any user data to the extent that the data is not reducible to an individual
user, or the user has to explicitly consent in use of personal data before the data is processed. In certain
circumstances, anonymisation of logged data may conflict with the service provider’s need for traceability.
On the other hand, when explicit consent of the user is needed, the question arises whether it is possible for
an agent to consent to the use of personal data of its user. 
Additionally, both logs and the identity administration need to be safeguarded e.g. to prevent agents from
maliciously changing logs. Unwanted access to the logs and other administration by users and agents should
be prevented,  also with regard to privacy issues as described above. It  needs to be determined who is
allowed to access which logging data and under which circumstances. 
Requirement 10: Unauthorized access to the logs and administrative data should be prevented.
5  Some issues which need to  be considered in  deciding whether  or not  to kill  a mobile agent  are discussed in:
Apistola, M., Brazier, F.M.T., Kubbe, O., Oskamp, A., Prins, J.E.J., Schellekens, M.H.M. and Voulon, M.B. (2002),
Migrating agents: Do sysadmins have a license to kill? In: Proceedings of the 3rd International SANE Conference
(SANE 2002).
6  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 regards any data that can be
traced to an individual as personal data. 
A technical  solution  is  to  install  access  control  policies  to  prevent  unwanted  access  to  the  logs  and
administrative data. For logs, another option is to dynamically generate “views” or presentations on the
logs, which depend on the credentials of the viewer, e.g. data that may identify a person can be filtered out.
3.4 Availability
To maintain its reputation as a reliable platform, an agent platform tries to limit interruption or disruption of
its service (a user may have subscribed to a specific service with a predefined quality of service, at a given
cost). As a result, service and system availability is expected. 
Requirement 11: Service and system availability need to be guaranteed.
To  prevent  unavailability,  a  platform  should  estimate  the  available  resources,  monitor  the  usage  of
resources  and  manage  them.  Example  technical  solutions  to  manage  resources  entail  (automated)
agreements on the use of system resources. To regulate the amount of resources agents are using, a platform
can use a lease system for resource usage by agents [26].
An essential element of performance is availability. Availability is a hard requirement for an agent to be
able to successfully complete its search in the multimedia database. The level of performance provided to
the visiting agent, including availability, can be agreed upon in so-called Service Level agreements (SLAs)
[27, 28, 29].  
Requirement 12: Clear and legally valid agreements are needed.
Whether an SLA that has been agreed upon by an agent and an agent platform can be regarded as a legally
valid contract, is uncertain. To establish a legally valid contract, two persons have to perform corresponding
acts of offer and acceptance.7 Since neither agents, nor agent platforms can as yet be considered to be legal
entities, the offer and acceptance by an agent and an agent platform must be reduced to both the agent’s user
and the platform owner. Without two legal entities having the will to establish certain legal consequences,
there can be no valid contract.
However, if an agent’s user gives an agent a specific assignment (in our scenario: to find and buy a
specific movie) and also a specific amount of e-cash the agent is allowed to spend, the question arises
whether the user’s will was not only directed at closing a contract concerning the purchase of that particular
movie, but also at establishing an “underlying” contract between the agent and the platform. If this is the
case, there may be a valid contract between the agent user and the platform owner.8  
Even if an SLA is not regarded as a legally valid contract, it can indeed have legal implications, for
example when a lease ends while the agent has not yet finished its tasks on the platform. If an agent is
unable  to  finish  its  search  for  movies,  the  agent  user  will  not  receive  any  movie  snippets,  and  as  a
consequence may suffer damages. 
In the above example of a specific assignment leading to a valid contract between the agent user and the
platform owner, the agent’s level of autonomy may be at stake. For the agreement to be legally valid, the
level of autonomy of the agent may need to be decreased substantially, whereas at the same time a higher
level of autonomy of the agent may be desirable for the agent to fulfil its search task properly. 
Also, if an agent is to act according to its user’s will, a user needs to be able to exercise direct control
over the agent at any time. The possibility of communication between the agent and its user has to be
guaranteed.  This  has  consequences  for  the  role  of  the  guardian  agent  in  the  scenario.  To  ensure  the
possibility of  direct  communication between an agent and its  user  at  any time, technical  measures are
needed. 
Further research in this area is needed, both to exactly determine the circumstances under which an SLA
can be regarded as a valid contract, and to maintain a balance between the agents’ autonomy and legal
validity of the agreements it concludes. 
7  See for an elaborate analysis Weitzenboeck, E.M., “Electronic agents and the formation of contracts”, International
Journal of Law and Information Technology, Vol. 9 Issue 3, autumn 2001, Oxford University Press, ISSN 0967-
0769, pp. 204-234.
8  See Sartor, G. (2002) Intentional concepts and the legal discipline of software agents. In J. Pitt (Ed.), Open Agent
Societies: Normative Specifications in Multi-Agent Systems. See also Sartor, G. Agents in Cyberlaw In: Proceedings
of the workshop on the Law of Electronic Agents (LEA02), 2002, Sartor, G. Cevenini, C. See also [1]
4 Technical considerations
An agent  platform is  middleware  (a  software  layer  between the  operating  system and  the  application
programs) that provides an execution environment for agents. Often, agent platforms offer facilities and
services to agents on the platform, for example facilities for communication and life-cycle support (starting,
pausing, resuming, deleting agents) and services like a Directory Service (White and Yellow Pages to find
agents and services). In addition, agent platforms can offer support for migration and security. Examples of
agent  platforms are AgentScape [15],  SeMoa9,  JADE10 and Cougaar.  A short  description of  JADE and
Cougaar and a comparison with AgentScape is given by Overeinder [15].
The scenario as proposed above can be implemented in the AgentScape agent platform. AgentScape
provides the necessary mapping of locations (user and service provider each have their own location) and
support for multiple hosts within one location. Migration of agents between locations is supported and user
locations can be dynamically connected and removed. The Web Service Gateway (WSG) for Internet and
database interactions is another feature that makes AgentScape particularly suitable for this scenario. 
Various security features,  which relate to  requirements mentioned above,  have been implemented in
AgentScape. The use of global and local identities,  leasing of resources, sandboxing of agents, signing
agent’s code and its state, and secure communication are the most prominent. 
Within AgentScape agents have a globally unique identifier, and a locally unique identifier within each
location at which they reside. The use of leases for resource access and monitoring is a means to provide
availability. To prevent unwanted interactions by agents with other entities, e.g. to protect the host on which
the agent is running, agents are ‘sandboxed’ or ‘jailed’.
For agent and agent state protection, e.g. to guarantee integrity of the agent’s code and data, an agent and
its data are stored in an Agent Container. The AgentScape platform implements an integrity verification
mechanism based on signing of the Agent Containers. This fulfils the requirement concerning protection
and detection measures to safeguard the integrity of the agent.
Communication between hosts in AgentScape, e.g. for the purpose of agent migration, has been secured.
Mutually authenticated, encrypted channels are set up using a key exchange protocol at the host-to-host
level. Thus, the requirement of protection of transmission is met.
Efforts to improve AgentScape and its security are still ongoing – requirements with respect to logging
for  example,  still  need  to  be  addressed.  Mechanisms for  logging are  available,  but  more  research  on
applicable policies is needed. 
5 Summary and future research
This article describes a scenario in which a mobile agent moves to the location of the service provider and
searches a multimedia database on behalf of its user. In this scenario, an intermediary (the guardian agent)
is used to communicate the search results to the user and take care of final arrangements. In the context of
the scenario,  a number of security and related issues have been discussed. In the above discussion, the
following points for further research can be identified. 
Firstly, there is  the issue of logging in distributed mobile agent environments.  Protocols need to be
developed to propagate updates according to specific policies. These issues appear to be related to update
propagation in distributed object systems. The theories and techniques developed for object systems may be
applicable to agent systems as well, though complicated by agent mobility.
Secondly, how to realize identity management in mobile agent systems needs further research. Facilities
are  needed  for  identity  administration.  Entities,  e.g.  users  and  agents,  should  to  be  able  to  operate
anonymously or pseudo-anonymously. However, under certain circumstances, information may be needed
with respect to the identity of the user, therefore information on the identities has to be managed and be
accessible for  entities with appropriate  credentials.  Another open issue regards identity management of
possible agent’s clones, children and helpers. 
Thirdly,  further  research  is  needed  in  mobile  agent  and  security  issues,  e.g.  agents  carrying  and
communicating confidential information. In case a mobile agent visits a variety of service providers, it may
9  http://www.semoa.org/
10  http://jade.tilab.com/
need to keep secret or prove possession of certain information, e.g. passwords and private keys, to others
than its user. Protocols are needed to check the credentials or certificates of a migratory agent.
 An example of an agent platform within which a number of these issues are addressed has been briefly
discussed describing the technical feasibility of a number of the suggested solutions.  It is clear that further
research is needed.
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